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Striking the Wrong Balance:
Constituency Statutes and
Corporate Governance
Edward D. Rogers*
I. INTRODUCTION
When corporate executives visit statehouses and Capitol Hill, they
usually seek to reduce, rather than enlarge, their legal obligations to
employees, customers, suppliers, and the public. Recently, however,
executives have asked for authority to consider the interests of these
groups when making corporate decisions, including decisions regarding
control of the corporation itself.' To date, twenty-nine states have com-
plied by enacting so-called "constituency" statutes.2 The typical constit-
uency statute expressly empowers corporate directors to consider "the
effects of any corporate action upon employees, suppliers and custom-
ers of the corporation, communities in which officers or other establish-
ments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors."' If
these statutes are broadly construed by courts to sanction interest-bal-
* The author recently completed a clerkship with the Honorable Anthony J.
Scirica of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and is now an
associate at Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author. The author wishes to thank
Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid, Alex Rogers, and Tom Tobiason for their encourage-
ment and incisive comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L REV.
111 (1987); see also Peter Behr, Debating the Nature of U.S. Corporations; Recent
Turmoit Raises Issues of Ownership, Responsibility, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1987, at
GI.
2. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 27 & n. 56 (1992) (listing states with constituen-
cy statutes).
3. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1993).
ancing at the expense of shareholders, they will fundamentally alter the
traditional duties of corporate boards and managers.4
Constituency statutes have sparked much legal scholarship concern-
ing whether they will achieve their stated goal of protecting
nonshareholder groups. This debate focuses on the capacity and sinceri-
ty of corporate boards and managers to balance interests effectively.
Commentators dispute whether the statutes will promote corporate
"social responsibility" or merely serve as a blank check for corporate
managers to entrench themselves. 5 Opponents of the statutes urge a
narrow construction while proponents promote an expansive reading.'
This Article analyzes constituency statutes from a different perspec-
tive. It examines how the interest-balancing sanctioned by the statutes
raises dangers, given the distribution of power within corporations, by
comparing the corporation to the federal government, another interest-
balancing institution in which power is shared. Focusing on the rela-
tionship between the board and management, this Article notes that the
numerous checks and balances developed to equalize power between
Congress and the executive branch are absent in the corporate context.
The comparison between political and corporate governance demon-
strates that corporate power is concentrated in management, which
remains insulated from the type of accountability that influences politi-
cal decision-making. The comparison also provides a source for alleviat-
ing this problem through an increase in the power of directors. The
Article concludes that the broad discretion granted by constituency
statutes will increase management's power, thereby making a bad situa-
tion worse for shareholders, and potentially endangering the interests of
other constituencies with which management's interests often conflict.
To counter this problem, this Article proposes that corporate gover-
4. Broad construction of the statutes is not a foregone conclusion, particularly
since the authority to balance these interests is typically phrased in permissive rather
than mandatory terms. See id. Nor have the few cases construing the statutes ana-
lyzed this problem closely. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1016 (E.D. Wis.) (upholding board resistance to tender offer
on the ground that offer was not in the interest of any of these constituencies),
affd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
5. For a recent articulation of these opposing arguments, see James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 97 (1991) (arguing against constituency statutes); Steven M. Wallman, The Proper
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Du-
ties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991) (arguing in favor of constituency statutes); see
also Orts, supra note 2 (canvassing the various positions).
6. Compare Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Poten-
tial for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw 2253 (1990) (urging narrow construction), with
Wallman, supra note 5 (urging broad construction).
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nance incorporate mechanisms to insure accountability similar to those
that have successfully diffused power in the political arena.
II. THE CORPORATE GOALS DEBATE
Constituency statutes rekindle an old debate over whether the law
should limit corporate goals to profit maximization for shareholders or
expand corporate goals to include consideration of affected groups,
such as employees, customers, suppliers, and communities. This debate
is not without common ground. Nobody disputes that public policy
balances the interests of employees, communities, and others against
the corporation's interest in making profits for its shareholders.7 Propo-
nents and opponents of "broad corporate goals"8 also agree that if prof-
it maximization is considered over the long term, it often will not con-
flict with the interests of the corporation's other constituencies? Treat-
ing employees well, for example, helps ensure a more content and thus
more productive work force. Likewise, charitable contributions can im-
prove a corporation's image and generate good will.'0
The real dispute concerns whether corporations should balance other
constituencies' interests where a conflict exists between such interests
and those of the shareholders." Corporation law has traditionally au-
thorized a board of directors to pursue only the goal of profit maximi-
zation," with limited exceptions.'3 As a result, nonshareholder constit-
7. Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American
Competitiveness, March, 1990, 46 Bus. LAW 241, 244 (1990) [hereinafter
"Roundtable"]; see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986).
8. This Article will use the phrase "broad corporate goals" to refer to balancing
interests of various constituencies within the corporate decisionmaking process as op-
posed to remitting these interests solely to the public policymaking process.
9. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 7, at 681-84 (1986); Roundtable, supra note 7, at
244.
10. See Steven M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes,
19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1000 (1992).
11. Even the Business Roundtable, among the most vocal proponents of broad
corporate goals, concedes that long-term profit-maximization may conflict with the
interests of other constituencies. Roundtable, supra note 7, at 24445. It has observed
that "[riesolving the potentially differing interests of various stakeholders and the best
long-term interest of the corporation and its shareholders involves compromises and
tradeoffs," and it is "impossible to assure that all [stakeholders] will be satisfied be-
cause competing claims may be mutually exclusive." Id.
12. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
13. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
uencies have typically found protection from hardships caused by cor-
porate decisions not in the boardroom but in federal and state legisla-
tures, through labor, environmental, health and safety, antitrust, and
other laws.
Critics of broad corporate goals offer two different arguments, a
"monitoring" argument and a "political" argument. The monitoring argu-
ment focuses on the dangers to shareholders under a "broad corporate
goals" regime. It stresses that broad corporate goals are too amorphous
to provide a meaningful benchmark by which shareholders can hold
boards and managers accountable. 4 Rather, corporate executives
should recognize that the shareholders serve as a proxy for profit maxi-
mization as the group entitled to residual profits from the corpora-
tion. 5 Constituency statutes reduce boards' and managers' accountabil-
ity to shareholders by authorizing boards to balance interests and by
deterring takeovers."
The "political" argument emphasizes that broad corporate goals will
result in poor social policy decisions and thus undermine their stated
objectives. This argument holds that boards and managers are ill-suited
to make the inherently political decisions of balancing constituencies,
which requires judgment about the proper allocation of wealth in soci-
ety."' Unifying the arguments against broad corporate goals and con-
(Amer. Law Inst. 1992) [hereinafter "ALI Principles"] (authorizing exceptions from the
profit-maximization norm for compliance with the law, "ethical considerations," and
limited charitable contributions).
14. CLARK, supra note 7, at 20.
15. Id. at 678. Considering shareholders as a proxy for profit maximization obvi-
ates the need to confront the rhetorically appealing argument made by broad corpo-
rate goals proponents that the big winners in the takeover market are venal
arbitrageurs. For a discussion of this argument, see Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to
Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 124 (1990) [hereinafter Gilson, Just Say No].
16. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841-45 (1981)
[hereinafter Gilson, Tender Offers] (arguing the superiority of takeovers over mergers
or assets sales, which first require board approval and then shareholder approval, or
proxy contests, whose effectiveness is reduced by legal rules and collective action
problems).
17. See Christopher J. Smart, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should
Be Our Brothers' Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 330 (1988). Two distinct
rationales underpin this argument. First, critics argue that boards lack the "political
legitimacy" necessary to weigh these interests since they are private officeholders
whose wealth makes them unrepresentative both of society and of the groups most
affected by corporate conduct. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 693. A second rationale
focuses on the incompetency rather than the unrepresentative character of corporate
boards and managers. In this view, the "business values" of profit maximization clash
too sharply with the political and social judgments necessary to design effective pub-
lic policies. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 102-03 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1967).
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stituency statutes is a concern that boards and managers will abuse
their new-found discretion to further their own interests. 8
Defenders of broad corporate goals dispute the assumption underly-
ing the monitoring argument by characterizing shareholders as passive
investors, less dependent on the corporation than other constituencies,
and thus not entitled to monitor corporate activities.'" This enables
broad-goals proponents to dismiss the monitoring argument as misguid-
ed rather than refute it. They attack the political argument against
broad corporate goals more directly by pointing to defects in govern-
ment. Government is flawed, they argue, because congressmen and
senators care largely, if not exclusively, about their own re-election and
remain captive to the special interests they are supposed to regulate.'
This second argument is crucial to the success of the first. Because
Congress and state legislatures retain the power to preempt many cor-
porate balancing decisions through legislation, it follows that according
balancing power to corporations as well as government will have a pos-
itive effect on social policy.
Both proponents and opponents of broad corporate goals should
worry that, if unchecked, corporate decisionmakers will act in their
own self-interest at the expense of corporate constituencies, however
defined. This Article explores that problem by comparing the institu-
tional settings in which corporate and political decisionmakers operate.
III. COMPARISONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Business Roundtable has argued that:
Corporate governance is... erroneously compared to political governance [be-
cause] the fundamental purposes of the corporation as an economic entity are
quite different from those of a political body .... A corporation has as its prime
purpose the long-term optimization of economic outcomes, [which) requires the
ability to act quickly and responsively. Legislative bodies, on the other hand, rep-
resent and give expression to a multiplicity of constituent interests. Our political
18. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 692.
19. See Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the. Rule of Law, in, THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 39 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1967); Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Greening of the Boardroom: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility,
10 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 15, 36 (1973) (address of Professor Chamberlain).
20. See Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the
Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV.
343, 381 (1981).
system is designed to create compromises between competing interests... [and
is accordingly] a slow and deliberative process that discourages bold moves or
right angle turns .... An additional difference between economic and political
organizations is that there are economic alternatives immediately available to an
unhappy shareholder .... For all of these reasons.... [n]ominating, procedures,
the accountabilities and liabilities of elected representatives, the voting process,
and recourse alternatives are, and should be, vastly different."1
Although few can disagree that the speed and decisiveness needed for
business decisions counsels against wholesale importation of political
decisionmaking structures into the boardroom, the Roundtable's argu-
ment is otherwise flawed in several respects. First, constituency statutes
remove several of the Roundtable's bases to distinguish corporate from
political governance. The statutes reduce, or make less attractive, the
"economic alternatives immediately available to an unhappy shareholder"
by making it easier for boards to install anti-takeover measures in the
guise of protecting other constituencies.' Furthermore, in authorizing
boards "to create compromises between competing interests," the stat-
utes make corporate decisionmaking more, rather than less, like political
decisionmaking.
More broadly, comparing political and corporate governance has theo-
retical and practical appeal. Corporate law, like political science and
constitutional law, focuses on concerns of power, accountability, and
checks and balances. Additionally, the arms of corporate decisionmaking
have analogues in the political arena. In theory, the board functions as a
legislature elected by a polity (the shareholders), and it authorizes ac-
tions by management, which serves as the corporation's executive
branch.'
The problem is that, in practice, the board is often the weak link in
corporate governance.24 This Article develops this claim by comparing
the distribution of power between Congress and the Executive Branch
21. Roundtable, supra note 7, at 24344.
22. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing
boards to "consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and custom-
ers of the corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located and all other pertinent factors" when discharging their du-
ties).
23. See E. Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 218-31 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1967).
24. As Professor Bernard Black put it:
In theory, the shareholders of public companies elect directors, who watch
corporate officers, who manage/watch the company on the shareholders' be-
half. But since Berle and Means, we have understood that this theory is a
fiction. The managers-the current officers and directors-pick the directors,
and the shareholders rubberstamp the managers' choices.
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L REV. 520, 521 (1990).
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with the distribution between the board and management in the typical
large corporation. Concluding that power is more evenly distributed in
government than in the corporation, this Article looks to political institu-
tions for tools to improve corporate governance by increasing the
board's capacity and responsibility to hold managers accountable to
shareholders. The Article then confronts the broad-corporate-goals argu-
ment on its own terms. Drawing on the earlier comparisons and on some
broader concerns about self-regulation, it explores the social policy im-
plications of letting corporations balance interests through constituency
statutes.
IV. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Institutional Differences Between Political and
Corporate Governance
Checks and balances in political and corporate governance can be
divided into three categories. One category is the electoral process, the
means by which shareholders and voters remove poor decisionmakers.
Second, internal controls help distribute power within corporate and
political governance structures. These include control over the agenda,
control of knowledge, and control of information, all of which affect the
relative power of the legislative and executive branches. A third group of
checks and balances consists of external controls that supplement inter-
nal constraints as limitations on power, including interest groups and the
media in the political context, and the courts and markets in the corpo-
rate context.
This analytic framework considers shareholders only as electors of
directors and as investors in the stock market. Alternatively, sharehold-
ers could be viewed as the corporate analogue to political interest
groups. These subgroups of the electorate have the resources and knowl-
edge to influence political decisionmaking, just as shareholders have
power to influence corporate decisionmaking. However, problems such
as collective action, lack of knowledge and expertise, and the transitory
nature of many stockholdings historically have precluded meaningful
shareholder input in corporate governance.25 The growth in institutional
investors may enable shareholders to overcome this historic weakness.'
1. Campaigns and Elections
The right to oust board members through proxy contests constitutes a
potentially important means by which the shareholders can check the
board's power, but it is limited by the expense of proxy contests and by
the control of management and the board over the proxy process.27 One
obvious difference between corporate and congressional election proce-
dures is in the existence of opposition candidates. Congressional seats
are typically contested. By contrast, "in 99.9% of corporate elections held
in [a recent year], only one slate was offered."' Moreover, unlike in the
political arena where voters often select candidates through primary
elections, the executive branch-management-normally picks the
slate.'
Another difference lies in the sources of campaign funds for political
and corporate elections. Incumbent board members can use corporate
funds to wage proxy contests against insurgents.' This practice is sub-
ject only to the ill-defined limitation that the funds can only be used for
contests relating to corporate "policy" rather than to "personnel."" In
the congressional context, an analogous source of funds would be public
monies or, more precisely, funds from individual office accounts. These,
however, are not permissible sources of campaign funds.'
25. On collective action, see, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991). On shareholders' lack of ex-
pertise with complex issues of corporate governance and operations, and on their
short holding periods, see ALI Principles, supra note 13, at 54.
26. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277
(1991).
27. See, e.g., Gilson, Tender Offers, supra note 16, at 843.
28. JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS 22 (1989).
29. Id. at 23.
30. See, e.g., EDWARD R. ARANOW & HERBERT A. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 547-65 (1968).
31. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955);
ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 30, at 550 (labeling the distinction "illusory"); MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 104-05 (1976)
(arguing that the policy/personnel distinction is "meaningless" because of the obvious
characterization problems it creates).
32. Senators and congressmen may not receive public monies for campaigns as
presidential candidates can under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 9006 (1988).
Furthermore, Rule 41.1 of the Standing Rules of the Senate provides for strict segre-
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The congressional election rules have considerable conceptual appeal
as a potential means of liberating board elections from management
control and transforming them into a more meaningful check for share-
holders. In practice, however, these rules have failed to reduce the en-
trenchment of incumbents in the Senate and Congress. More than 90
percent of congressmen and two-thirds of the senators are routinely re-
elected.' The high incumbency rate occurs partly because incumbents
themselves enact the legislation governing the sources of election financ-
ing. Since the policy/personnel distinction limits the courts' ability to set
campaign finance rules for corporate directors, incumbents make the
campaign finance decisions in corporate government as well; typically,
only successful insurgents are reimbursed.'
In one respect, the corporate rules are arguably more sound than the
congressional rules. The use of corporate funds for proxy contests pro-
tects against the "deep pockets" phenomenon,' in which the campaign
costs proliferate to the point that a well-financed candidate wins simply
by outspending his opponent. This phenomenon has also been cited in
support of requiring public financing or spending caps in congressional
campaigns. Without such devices many worthy challengers may be de-
terred from running.'
In sum, the congressional election process suggests several ideas for
reform to the corporate election process, most notably the use of opposi-
tion slates. However, the congressional election process also provides
grounds for pessimism by demonstrating that rule changes alone cannot
reduce the entrenchment of incumbents, especially when the winners
make the rules. A more promising source for corporate governance re-
gation of campaign staff from Senate staff, and Rule 40.1 prohibits use of the con-
gressional franking privilege within 60 days of primary or general elections for any
mass mailings relating to anything other than official business, as does Rule 46.6 of
the Rules of the House of Representatives.
33. GLENN R. PARKER, CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESS: PATTERNS IN CONGRESSIONAL
BEHAVIOR 14-15 (1986). Moreover, the consistently high incumbency rate is self-rein-
forcing. In the 1988 Senate elections, for example, incumbents received 80 percent of
the total contributions made by political action committees, which are among the
largest sources of campaign funds. Jack W. Genmond & Jules Witcover, Fund-Raising
Imperative Drives Campaigning, 21 NAT'L L.J. 694 (1989).
34. EISENBERG, supra note 31, at 121-27.
35. Id. at 108.
36. See Chuck Alston, Image Problems Propel Congress Back to Campaign Finance
Bills, 49 CONG. Q. 275, 275-81 (1991).
form arises from examination of the different decisionmaking structures
within the government.
2. Internal Sources of Accountability
Just as the division of responsibility between Congress and the Presi-
dent is a major focus of constitutional law and political science, the allo-
cation of power between the board and management is an important
concern in corporate governance. Management's preeminence results
from several factors, each of which merits separate treatment.
a. Personnel in corporate and political governance
There exists no overlap between the personnel in the legislative and
executive branches of government. By contrast, in the corporate sphere,
inside directors act as both managers and as directors. The resulting self-
policing is a matter of serious concern, which has inspired a strong
movement toward outside directors.'
However, neither in the political nor the corporate arena is the issue
as simple as the overlap in personnel. In government, the independence
of the legislative and executive branches is compromised by
subgovernments in specific issue areas, called "iron triangles."' This
term refers to a three-sided relationship between a congressional com-
mittee, the executive agency over which it has jurisdiction, and private
interest groups regulated by those two branches of government.
The triangles work because each leg depends upon the other two for
favorable policies or special treatment at the expense of more effective
public policy and independence of the legislative and executive branch-
es.' One such "iron triangle" is the relationship between the Senate Ag-
riculture Committee, the Department of Agriculture, and the National
Corn Growers Association. The Corn Growers, for example, might want a
generous subsidy or favorable regulation from the Senate Committee or
the Agriculture Department. In return, it could contribute to the Senate
Committee Chairman's re-election campaign and lobby to expand the
authority of the appropriate bureau chief of the Agriculture Department.
Additionally, the Corn Growers could offer a lucrative lobbying job to
those government officials upon retirement or defeat in an election. Simi-
larly, the bureau chief in the Agriculture Department could dispense lar-
37. Recent studies have shown that well over half of the members of large corpo-
rate boards are outside directors. See ALl Principles, supra note 13, at 144 (citing
studies on board membership).
38. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 33, at 199-214.
39. Id. at 201-02.
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gesse, such as research grants, to the constituents of the Chairman of the
Senate Agriculture Committee. The Chairman could return the favor by
maintaining the bureau chiefs annual appropriation at a healthy level.4 °
These relationships inhibit government actors from policing each other
and from saying "no" to private interests."
Symbiotic relationships among groups of shareholders, directors, and
managers can also undercut accountability in the corporate context. For
example, an outside director may be a partner in a law firm whose client
is the company on whose board he or she sits. ' Or a private pension
fund manager may seek investment business from the company whose
shares he or she manages.' Such relationships might discourage the di-
rector or pension fund manager from vigorously overseeing these corpo-
rate transactions.
An appropriate legal rule for limiting "iron triangle"-type conflicts in
the corporate context would distinguish not between outside and inside
directors but rather between interested and disinterested directors. The
American Law Institute ("ALI"), in Principles of Corporate Governance
("Principles"), provides a definition of directors with a "significant rela-
tionship" to the corporation, in order to discourage the development of
these conflicts." The ALI's definition of "significant relationship" in-
cludes those members of the board whose business or family relation-
ships bring them into a symbiotic position with the corporation, and the
Principles require that board committees include a majority of directors
without such relationships.45 The problems that "iron triangles" create in
government suggest that this reform can help increase the independence
of the board.
b. Agenda control
The board's institutional weakness also results from management's
power over the agenda of board meetings, absent a crisis in the corpora-
40. See id. at 210-11.
41. See id. at 206 (arguing that such relationships "may lead committee members
to adamantly defend an agency from its critics [and] ignore instances of agency mis-
feasance").
42. This example is drawn from ALI Principles, supra note 13, at § 1.29(a)(5).
43. See Black, supra note 24, at 596-97.
44. ALI Principles, supra note 13, at §§ 1.34 (defining "significant relationship"),
3A.02, 3A.04, 3A.05 (requiring majority of disinterested directors on audit, nominating,
and compensation committees).
45. Id.
tion." The ability to set the agenda is a critical source of leverage for
the CEO because inclusion of an item on the board's agenda is a precon-
dition to the board's exercise of decisionmaking power. Items not placed
on the agenda are immune from formal board consideration. A recent
study of the boards of large corporations revealed that many board mem-
bers view agenda power as one of management's most potent tools.47 In
addition to agenda power, management typically controls what informa-
tion the directors receive before meetings. The CEO runs the board
meetings, which gives him power to preclude meaningful discussion by
scheduling enough presentations to swallow all available meeting time.'
In contrast to the corporate context, Congress and the executive
branch share power over the legislative agenda. Although Congress tech-
nically has absolute power over its calendar, the process of agenda-set-
ting often involves consultation and, at times, conflict between the White
House and congressional leaders.4 ' For example, the legislative battle
over enactment of legislation to give employees advance notification of
plant closings illustrates an agenda conflict. First, Congress attached the
plant-closing bill to an important piece of trade legislation in the summer
preceding the 1988 presidential election.' President Reagan then vetoed
the trade bill, forcing Congress to enact the plant-closing bill separately
with the supermajorities necessary to avoid what could have been a
second veto." In particular, the plant-closing bill illustrates a type of
"tying" strategy; more generally, it illustrates the maneuvering that occurs
in the legislative agenda-setting process.52
One commentator has analogized managers' agenda power to the con-
trol exerted by the House Rules Committee in limiting the floor amend-
ments congressional representatives can attach to legislation produced
by the House's substantive lawmaking committees.' The House Rules
Committee exercises an important gatekeeping function through its pow-
er to declare floor amendments not germane to a pending bill and thus
incapable of consideration by the full House.' Although the germane-
46. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW 1477, 1484 (1984).
47. LORSCn, supra note 28, at 82-83.
48. Id. at 87.
49. See generally MARK A. PETERSON, LEGISLATING TOGETHER: THE WHITE HOUSE AND
CAPITOL HILL FROM EISENHOWER TO REAGAN 35-37 (1990).
50. See Plant Closing Measures, 43 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 678 (1987).
51. See Matthew Cooper & Allan Holmes, The Disaster that Never Happened, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 26, 1990, at 47.
52. See generally id.
53. See Black, supra note 24, at 594. Although Professor Black draws this analogy
with respect to managers' control over shareholder proposals, his general point, that
agenda control influences outcomes, applies in the context of managers' control over
the board's agenda as well.
54. Rule 16.7 of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires that all amend-
[Vol. 21: 777, 1994) Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance
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ness requirement seems like a noncontroversial procedural tool, the
Committee often manipulates this rule to effect politically desired legisla-
tive agendas. For example, the Committee approved an amendment to
attach the plant-closing-notification bill to the 1988 trade bill, despite the
persuasive protests of Republican congressmen that it violated the ger-
maneness rule.'
The Rules Committee analogy does not hold up in the corporate con-
text for several reasons. First, the constitutional requirements of bicam-
eral passage of legislation and presidential signature exert countervailing
pressure against the Rules Committee, as President Reagan's successful
veto of the 1988 trade bill illustrates.' The House Rules Committee,
therefore, constitutes only one of the competing sources of legislative
agenda-setting power. Second, and more importantly, the Rules Commit-
tee is an agenda mechanism of the legislative branch rather than the
executive branch. No such system of checks and balances exists in the
corporate arena, because the board has no mechanism comparable to the
Rules Committee that would give it leverage over its agenda.
Management's nearly unilateral control over agenda-setting hinders the
board's ability to oversee management's performance. An appropriate
reform would give the board some influence over its own agenda, a goal
that could be achieved in several ways.
c. Committees as sources of expertise and information
Corporate boards face significant informational constraints that handi-
cap their efforts to hold managers accountable. 7 This occurs because
directors serve part-time and lack independent sources of expertise.'
The board's limitations constitute one justification for allowing inside
ments offered on the House floor be germane to the bill. This requirement has been
variously defined as consistent with the "fundamental purpose" of the bill or at least
within the jurisdiction of the committee that has reported the bill. The plant-closing
bill clearly failed the second of these definitions, since it was within the jurisdiction
of the House Education and Labor Committee, while the Ways and Means Committee
had jurisdiction over the trade bill. A closer question was whether legislation on
plant closings, which result in part from foreign competition, was sufficiently related
to the trade bill to meet the "fundamental purpose" requirement.
55. 134 CONG. REC. H2280 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
56. For example, an amendment barred by the House Rules Committee may easily
be attached as an amendment in the Senate, included in the final bill produced from
a House-Senate Conference, and ultimately enacted into law.
57. See LORSCH, supra note 28, at 56-58.
58. See id. at 23-25, 57.
directors.' The congressional response to these problems provides a
less conflict-ridden solution to increase the board's expertise. During the
early days of the Republic, Congress faced the same informational con-
straints currently facing boards of directors. As one scholar has noted:
The early Congress remained formally unspecialized .... [while] the executive
branch... instituted specialized organization in the form of cabinet departments.
The resulting disparity between the specialized executive and the unspecialized
legislature was most apparent in financial affairs, and was impressively exploited
by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. By 1795, on matters of debt,
finance, currency, and expenditures, the Congress was outmaneuvered at every
turn by Hamilton's operation at Treasury.'
In response, Congress created permanent standing committees with
defined areas of expertise."1 This "division of labor insulates the legisla-
ture from executive capture, "' and to this day, congressional commit-
tees provide critical sources of specialized knowledge. They draft legisla-
tion and improve Congress' capacity to oversee the performance of the
executive branch.' Furthermore, individual members of Congress rely
heavily on committees as informational resources, and studies show that
congressional committees serve as "voting cues" for members on legisla-
tion with which they are not intimately familiar.' This dependence has
grown in recent years as the details of legislation are increasingly ham-
mered out in committees and as senators and congressmen face greater
demands on their time.' Again, the legislative development of the plant-
closing-notification bill provides evidence of this phenomenon. In adopt-
ing the plant-closing bill, first as an amendment to the 1988 trade bill and
later as a free-standing piece of legislation, both the House and Senate
deferred largely to the expertise of the committees in drafting the mea-
sure.'
59. See, e.g., ALI Principles, supra note 13, at § 3A.01 cmt. c ("[plermitting senior
executives to serve on the board ensures knowledgeable and detailed board discus-
sion about the business, and encourages management to take important issues to the
board").
60. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative
Trade-Off, 103 POL. ScL Q. 461, 465 (1988).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 482
63. On the drafting function of committees, see generally Shepsle, supra note 60.
On the oversight functions of committees, see BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 64-69 (1990).
64. See PARKER, supra note 33, at 140.
65. Id.
66. Floor consideration of the plant-closing bill initially took place in the Senate as
an amendment to the trade bill. Although compromises were struck that weakened its
language, those compromises were drafted by the relevant subcommittee and full
committee chairmen, Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy, respectively. See Plant-Clos-
ing Measures, supra note 50, at 678-79. The only other floor consideration of the bill
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Corporations have also begun to use committees to improve the quali-
ty of decisionmaking on their boards. A recent study indicates that "[b]y
1987, 75 percent of the boards of industrial companies had [three] to
[five] committees, the most common of which were audit, nominating,
and compensation." 7 That study also reveals that directors view com-
mittees as essential resources given their informational, knowledge, and
time limitations,' in much the same way Congress does.
Despite surface similarities between congressional and board commit-
tees, important differences exist between the two. First, formation of
corporate committees is optional, and second, inside directors may serve
as members.' Both features inhibit board committees from holding
managers accountable. The ALl Principles include provisions to recom-
mend or require certain types of committees on all large corporations,
such as audit, nominating, and compensation committees, and would
require that a majority of their membership be drawn from disinterested
directors."
The experience of the congressional committee process suggests that
these reforms are sound and perhaps should be extended, at least as a
matter of corporate practice, if not statutory mandate. Corporate com-
mittees should participate actively in setting the board's agenda and
offering proposals at board meetings, just as congressional committees
report legislation to the full House and Senate. For example, the com-
pensation committee could be authorized to study different types of
performance-based compensation systems, either by itself or by contract-
ing out.7 It should then be able to propose such a system to the full
board for consideration.
came during consideration of the conference report on the trade bill, at which time
both the House and Senate rejected floor amendments. See 134 CONG. REC. H2284
(daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (covering House proceedings).
67. LORSCH, supra note 28, at 58. ALI Principles reports that a 1990 study found
99 percent of responding companies had audit committees, ALl Principles, supra note
13, at § 3.05 (Reporter's Note 4), 60 percent had nominating committees, id. at
§ 3A.04 (Reporter's Note 1), and 93 percent had compensation committees, id. at
§ 3A.05 (Reporter's Note 1).
68. LORSCH, supra note 28, at 59.
69. Delaware law allows, but does not require, board committees and is silent as
to whether they may include inside directors. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1993).
70. ALI Principles, supra note 13, at §§ 3A.02 (requiring audit committee), 3A.04,
3A.05 (recommending nominating and compensation committees).
71. See id. at § 3A.05 cmt. d ("the compensation committee should periodically
acquire relevant information about internal and external compensation practices").
For some, practical considerations dictate that even with committees
the board should not have the agenda-setting power of Congress. The
board lacks knowledge, information, and expertise when compared with
the CEO, who has the benefit of a large staff.72 Why should better deci-
sions be expected if agenda power is given to a board of part-time direc-
tors or its committees? By contrast, because it functions on a full-time
basis and has a wealth of collective expertise from a large staff, Con-
gress faces no such knowledge gap. But that argument begs the question
of whether the board should operate under such a handicap. A closer
look at the way Congress uses committees and other structures to cope
with knowledge and informational constraints provides a possible answer
to that question.
d. Staff and oversight agencies as sources of expertise and
information
The existence of committees, without more, represented only the ini-
tial congressional response to executive capture. Since World War II,
Congress has increased its informational capacities. First, Congress has
established powerful oversight organizations. Ten congressional commit-
tees have investigation subcommittees' and Congress has, by legisla-
tion, expanded the mission of the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
beyond its traditional auditing function, to include review of the perfor-
mance of federal programs.74 In addition, the creation of the Congressio-
nal Budget Office ("CBO") in 1974, has given Congress "an objective,
independent source of budgetary expertise," 5 whose economic forecasts
often diverge from the more optimistic predictions published by the
president's Office of Management and Budget. Although nobody would
argue that the federal government has won the war on waste or on bud-
get deficits, observers agree that the CBO and the GAO give the Con-
gress important oversight tools and a source of early warning in cases of
executive mismanagement. 6
These benefits could be realized by increasing the role of the board's
audit committee or by the creation of new committees to oversee opera-
tional management or strategic planning.77 Similar diagnostic and early
72. LORSCH, supra note 28, at 80-88.
73. ROSEN, supra note 63, at 65.
74. Id. at 76.
75. James A. Thurber, New Powers of the Purse: An Assessment of Congressional
Budget Reform, in LEGISLATIVE REFORM (Leroy N. Rieselbach ed., 1978) [hereinafter
Rieselbach ed.].
76. See generally Shepsle, supra note 60; ROSEN, supra note 63.
77. The suggestion for strategic planning committees is made in LORSCH, supra
note 28, at 181.
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warning capacities would be provided under recent proposals for corpo-
rate "ombudspersons."8
The proposed creation of these new structures, however, raises the
problem of who would work in them. Enhanced congressional expertise
in oversight organizations and committees has resulted in part from an
exponential growth in congressional staff.' However, the increase in
congressional staff has not been free from criticism. One commentator
has argued that an increased staff reduces the democratic nature of Con-
gress because the staff has grown so large that it operates as an autono-
mous group of unelected policymakers. Also, because individual
members' staffs generate so many different projects for members of
Congress, they reduce the time members spend researching and delib-
erating legislation.8
For some of the same reasons, corporations and commentators have
largely rejected proposals to provide staffs to boards of directors. The
most extensive proposal of this type, put forth by former Supreme Court
Justice Arthur Goldberg, has been attacked as "both unsound and un-
workable" on grounds that it would create nothing more than "a shadow
staff with an institutionalized obligation to second-guess the manage-
ment, but with very limited responsibility for results,... would add addi-
tional expense and time ... [and would] create a further and unneces-
sary level of decisionmaking to corporations which already tend toward
overbureaucratization."'
The criticisms of both congressional and board staffs share a common
limitation. They focus largely on the size of the staff rather than as the
existence of the staff. However, the purpose of a staff is not to create
another "level of decisionmaking" but rather to enable the existing level
of decisionmaking-the board-to work better.' Furthermore, the addi-
78. Victor Futter, An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations: A Corpo-
rate Ombudsperson?, 46 Bus. LAW 29, 40-44 (1990).
79. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE
FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 240, 253 (1980) (detailing growth between
1947-79, and reporting that staff is responsible for most of the congressional oversight
that is done outside the GAO). Eighty-five percent of Congressmen in a recent survey
rated staff "very helpful" in increasing their oversight capacity. See ROSEN, supra note
63, at 67.
80. MALBIN, supra note 79, at 240-41.
81. EISENBERG, supra note 31, at 155-56; see also ALl Principles, supra note 13, at
§ 3.04 cmt. c (listing these objections).
82. As Professor Harvey Goldschmid put it, "[tihe idea is not to create a new
bureaucracy; a small independent staff would simply give the board the necessary
tion of staff would help committees compensate for the significant time
and information constraints faced by boards. For example, a compensa-
tion committee staff could research different types of performance-based
compensation systems appropriate to the corporation's particular indus-
try, or a nominating committee staff could help identify a pool of dis-
interested directors. Without a staff, committees will be forced to rely
largely on board members, whose time constraints gave rise to the for-
mation of the committees, or on management, who may have a conflict
if, for example, the issue is executive compensation. An alternative solu-
tion, adopted by the ALI Principles, would authorize disinterested direc-
tors to retain outside experts.' Like the proposal to establish a staff,
this approach would give the board a source of impartial advice and
expertise. However, because board members would have to retain the
experts on a case-specific basis, outside experts would more likely be
reactive, i.e., called in when the directors perceive the existence of a
problem, whereas a small permanent staff might provide directors with
early warning of the problem.
The foregoing discussion has focused on internal controls in the politi-
cal process. Committees, oversight organizations, staff, and agenda pow-
er help Congress influence policy development and oversee executive
performance and thus constitute important checks and balances in the
federal government. Granting corporate boards these tools would similar-
ly improve their capacity to exercise a meaningful oversight function by
providing independent sources of expertise and lessening their reliance
on inside directors and management.
The comparison between the board's current capacity and that of Con-
gress suggests that, for shareholders, constituency statutes make a bad
situation worse. They accord more power to directors already handi-
capped in exercising the powers they have. Furthermore, given the lop-
sided distribution of power in favor of managers, the managers, rather
than the directors, would likely do the balancing between constituencies.
The statutes would therefore undercut the board's ability to hold man-
agers accountable to shaleholders by authorizing managers to pursue a
different set of ill-defined goals.
Equally important checks and balances are provided by external con-
trols that help ensure that boards and legislatures properly use the pow-
ers they are given. An analysis of these forces reveals more striking dif-
ferences between corporate and political governance and sheds further
light on the efficacy of constituency statutes.
tools." Goldschmid, supra note 19, at 28.
83. ALI Principles, supra note 13, at § 3.04.
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3. External Sources of Accountability
a. The corporate context
External sources of accountability in the corporate sphere include the
capital markets, competition, the market for corporate control, judicial
review, and legislation."' Constituency statutes significantly weaken each
of these tools, except competition. By authorizing boards to install defen-
sive tactics after balancing interests,' the statutes deter takeovers, the
most powerful means by which the capital markets hold corporate man-
agers accountable. Additionally, the statutes reduce the effectiveness of
judicial review via stockholder suits by providing a broad and amorphous
rationale under which the board can defend its decisions. Finally, enact-
ment of these laws provides statutory support for boards to balance
other interests against those of shareholders, impeding state legislatures
from serving as a powerful external control on management.
i. Judicial review
A brief review of how constituency statutes hinder judicial review
under the widely used Delaware approach illustrates how these statutes
threaten to reduce the potency of the courts as an accountability mecha-
nism. Except in the case of self-interested transactions, which courts
carefully scrutinize under the duty of loyalty doctrine,' shareholders
typically enforce judicial remedies against directors under a duty of care
theory, and the courts then judge the board's action under the business
judgment rule."7 In the takeover context, which often pits the board and
management against shareholders, a heightened business judgment rule
adopted in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.' requires the board to
prove that it adopted a defensive measure because it had "reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
84. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 679; Statement of the Business Roundtable, The
Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corpo-
ration 2-3 (1978).
85. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1715, 1716 (1993) (authorizing interest
balancing in all board decisions).
86. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
87. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
88. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
existed because of another person's stock ownership" and that the defen-
sive measure adopted was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'
Unocal's "reasonability" test hardly provides airtight protection to
shareholders, as illustrated both by its use to authorize rejection of a
lucrative tender offer in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.' and by language in Unocal itself suggesting that the board could
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies." But despite its
ambiguities, the Unocal test remains an important source of protection
for shareholders, particularly when compared to constituency statutes.
These statutes either codify Unocal's suggestion concerning consider-
ation of interests other than that of shareholders, or eliminate the Unocal
test altogether by authorizing interest balancing.' Under a typical for-
mulation, directors must discharge their duties, which include the instal-
lation of takeover defenses, "in the best interests of the corporation."'
In making such decisions, the director "may... consider the effects of
any action on shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers of the
corporation, and communities in which offices or other establishments of
the corporation are located, and all other pertinent factors."' Broad ju-
dicial construction of these statutes would eviscerate Unocal's
heightened standard of review by explicitly sanctioning consideration of
these other interests as part of the determination that a potential hostile
takeover posed a "reasonable threat to corporate policy." Furthermore,
the mere existence of these statutes should certainly deter many tender
offers.
Nearly all of the twenty-nine constituency statutes take broad corpo-
rate goals a step further by building this mandate into their statutory
duty of care formulations. 5 The statutes, therefore, insulate under the
89. Id. at 955.
90. 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-55 (Del. 1989) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
91. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporations
Serve?: The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33,
47-49 (1991).
92. Nearly all of the other constituency laws authorize permissive balancing of
nonshareholder interests. See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search
for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAw 1355 (1991) (listing the statutes). This "may" formulation
codifies whatever ambiguity remained from Unocal. At least one state's statute con-
tains language expressly rejecting the Unocal threshold test. IND. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-35-
1 (1)(f) (West 1990) (providing that "certain judicial decisions in Delaware and oth-
er jurisdictions . . . relating to potential change of control transactions that impose a
different or higher degree of scrutiny on actions taken by directors in response to a
proposed acquisition of control of the corporation, are inconsistent with the proper
application of the business judgment rule under this article") (emphasis added).
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West 1993).
94. Id.
95. The Maine statute is representative of constituency statutes in general. It de-
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already permissive business judgment rule decisions made after balanc-
ing the interests of other constituencies. Broad construction of these
statutory provisions would effectively transform the business judgment
rule into an expansive grant of immunity for all corporate decisions out-
side the duty of loyalty arena. It is hard to imagine any business decision
that could not be defended as the product of balancing the interests of
other constituencies. This is especially true since the statutes provide no
guidance as to how the balancing is to take place.
ii. Legislation
Constituency statutes also reveal that shareholders cannot depend on
state legislatures as external sources of accountability over managers.
The swiftness with which states have adopted these statutes suggests
that, at least at the state level, even the most vocal and powerful share-
holders lack lobbying power. Their impotence stems from a variety of
sources, including the well-chronicled collective-action problems that
inhibit group activity among shareholders,' the states' understandably
parochial concerns about job flight, and the traditional "race to the bot-
tom" problem motivated by a concern for franchise taxes. 7 The mere
existence of these statutes in twenty-nine states implies state legislatures
are unwilling to help create more independent and effective boards of
directors.
Three devices can help protect shareholders from constituency stat-
utes. First, shareholders can vote for their corporations to opt out of the
statutes or to reincorporate in other states. Second, they can bring de-
rivative actions and urge narrow construction of the statutes. But these
are piecemeal and often expensive strategies, since opt-out proposals and
lawsuits are corporation-specific initiatives likely to draw concerted op-
position from management.
The third, more comprehensive solution is federal legislation setting
minimum standards for the conduct of directors. Federal legislation
fines a director's duty of care to include consideration of "the effects of any action
upon shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communi-
ties in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and all
other pertinent factors." Id.
96. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
97. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668-69 (1974) (discussing how Delaware franchise taxes ac-
counted for nearly one quarter of the state's total tax collections).
could neutralize the "race to the bottom" by creating a floor under which
states could not reduce duty of care standards for directors. Additionally,
parochialism is less likely to occur in Congress, where one state's gain is
another state's loss. But Congress' persistent refusal to enact such legis-
lation demonstrates that this is a long-shot strategy. Congressional inac-
tion reflects the other external constraints under which it operates, to
which it is now appropriate to turn.
b. The political context
Managerial discretion under constituency statutes is especially disturb-
ing, given the absence in the corporate context of external institutional
constraints present in the congressional context. Two principal con-
straints are the influence of private interest groups and the news media.
i. Interest groups
Private interest-group power is legion in the political process. Some
groups organize along economic lines, such as trade associations and
labor unions. The congressional battle over plant-closing legislation illus-
trates how private groups battle among themselves in an attempt to
shape or block legislation. These groups also issue voting ratings that
measure the support individual members of Congress lend to their caus-
es. These ratings provide powerful cannon fodder during re-election cam-
paigns.' Although scholars argue over whether these groups do more
harm than good in the political process, no one disputes that they consti-
tute a significant external check on congressional discretion.'
Recent years have also witnessed a sharp increase in the power of so-
called "cause" or "public" interest groups, such as Common Cause and
Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, which seek to improve government's ac-
countability to the public.'" Since they are financed on a grass-roots
basis by citizens, these groups are not beholden to narrow economic
interests. Rather, they exist to exert countervailing pressure against pri-
vate interests.'' For example, Common Cause effectively highlighted
98. "Incumbents use 'good' scores to raise money from ideological compatriots, and
challengers use 'bad' scores to show that a member is out of step with his constitu-
ents." Sheron Perkinson, Scorecards Find Few Shifts in 1989 Voting Patterns, 48
CONG. Q. 643 (Mar. 3, 1990).
99. The influence of private groups on legislation is so accepted as a truism that
it forms the basis for headlines in articles on legislative episodes. See, e.g, Nadine
Cohodas, Business Defeats Labor on Plant-Closing Bill, 43 CONG. Q. 2528 (Nov. 30,
1985) (chronicling the House defeat of the plant-closing bill in 1985).
100. See, e.g., Stephen Kurkjian, Officials Too Tempted by Travel, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 25, 1991, at 1 (describing groups' efforts to reform Congressional behavior).
101. ROSEN, supra note 63, at 102-08.
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abuses in Pentagon spending, to the chagrin of the large corporations de-
pendent on defense contracts, and has prompted Congress to confront
the influence of political action committees in election campaigns. °2
No comparable groups of shareholders currently perform the account-
ability functions of interest groups in government. Although institutional
investors may become a powerful interest group of shareholders,"2 it is
still too early to tell whether they will effectively play this role. "
ii. The media
The differential coverage of corporate and political decisionmaking by
the news media provides another contrast between the two arenas. Con-
gressional policymaking is subject to more intense public scrutiny than
ever before. This development has resulted from the "sunshine" reforms
of the post-Watergate era that opened committee markups and House-
Senate conference negotiations to public view,' from the televising of
House and Senate proceedings on C-Span, and from an ever increasing
and vigilant Washington press corps. The media also checks the influ-
ence of private interest groups in the political process because it tends
to be biased against the exertion of public power by these private groups
and in favor of the "cause" groups such as Public Citizen."2
Corporate decisional processes, by contrast, receive no such public
scrutiny. Board meetings are not open to the press. Indeed, "it is difficult
to imagine a broadcast station reporting on business executives in the
way they report the activities of ... politicians." 7 Additionally, the
print wire services typically report only "business stories at the end of a
102. Chuck Alston, Fertilizing the Grass Roots, 49 CONG. Q. 280 (Feb. 2, 1991)
(detailing the influence of Common Cause and Public Citizen in the current debate
over campaign finance legislation); Frank J. Sorauf, Campaign Money and the Press:
Three Soundings, 102 POL Sc. Q. 25, 38-40 (1987).
103. See supra note 27.
104. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L REV. 795 (1993) (discussing mixed empirical results of
studies of institutional investor behavior).
105. See generally Charles S. Bullock III, Congress in the Sunshine, in LEGISLATIVE
REFORM 209-21 (Leroy N. Rieselbach ed., 1978).
106. See Sorauf, supra note 102, at 26-27, 38-40 (arguing and providing empirical
evidence that media coverage tends to be biased against private interest groups be-
cause the media receives a majority of its source material from "public" interest
groups, such as Common Cause).
107. ROBERT LAMB ET AL., BUSINESS, MEDIA, AND THE LAW: THE TROUBLED. CONFLU-
ENCE 27 (1980).
quarter involving companies with earnings of $100 million or more," and
"[alt Dow Jones, which publishes The Wall Street Journal, any
transaction under $5 million must be unusual to be deemed newswor-
thy.""~ The public image of large corporations exerts some influence on
the behavior of corporate management. However, because the media
does not cover corporate decisionmaking in the same way that it covers
political decisionmaking, coverage of misfeasance comes after the fact in
reports of scandal or announcements of major catastrophes, such as the
Exxon Valdez oil spill."°
Increased media coverage for corporate decisionmaking, however,
poses its own set of problems. First, it may be unnecessary, at least for
shareholders, whose interests are limited to share price and events af-
fecting that price. Additionally, market analysts already exert pressure on
corporate managers. Greater media coverage might actually inhibit risk-
taking or profit-maximizing behavior by corporations. The media's ideo-
logical bias in political reporting suggests that it might not accept, for
example, a corporate policy emphasizing profit maximization and return
to shareholders. But the contrast between media coverage of government
and of corporate decisionmaking serves as another illustration of the
greater institutional constraints imposed on the political, as opposed to
the corporate, decisionmaking process.
4. Lessons From the Governmental Analogy
Any attempt to model corporate governance reforms on political insti-
tutions must remain sensitive to the legitimate differences between legis-
latures and corporations. Effective corporate management requires deci-
sive and swift decisionmaking to respond to market developments. The
political process, by contrast, moves at a deliberate pace and generates
compromise decisions that often represent incremental steps toward
identified goals. '
Again, the plant-closing legislation is illustrative. Enactment of legisla-
tion in 1988 to provide workers with advance notification of plant
closings represented the culmination of a fourteen-year effort."' By this
time, most large corporations were already providing the early notifica-
tion to workers that would be mandated by the bill."' The plant-closing
108. Id.
109. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker hit a reef off the coast of Alaska and
spilled millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. The captain of the ship
was found to be intoxicated at the time of the accident.
110. See Roundtable, supra note 7, at 243.
111. Merrill Goozner, Workers Already Give Notice on Flaws of Plant-Closing Law,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1988, at C1.
112. Id.
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legislation finally enacted was a measure significantly weakened by the
compromises necessary to secure its passage. Whereas the original 1975
version of the measure would have required businesses to provide two
years' advance notification, " ' the final version mandated only sixty
days' notice for workers and affected local communities."4 Further-
more, the legislation contained broad exemptions for faltering compa-
nies.15
The challenge in using the congressional/executive model as a source
for corporate governance reform lies in adopting those features that
would improve accountability of managers consistent with the realities of
corporate decisionmaking. This requires an analysis of why the lawmak-
ing process moves so slowly and incrementally. The delay in enacting the
plant-closing legislation resulted in part from the procedural require-
ments of legislation, notably passage in each house of an original bill and
then a conference report, followed by, presidential approval. A far more
important source of delay, and the chief cause of the final bill's modest
character, was the need for compromise between two powerful constitu-
encies: business and organized labor.
This factor alone counsels against according the board and managers
the authority to balance the interests of various constituencies. One
scholar has observed that a "multi-interest board.., would be a debating
society, incapable of reaching the timely decisions that are essential to
efficiency, [and that] management would be even freer than now from
rigorous audit by their boards of directors." 6 This criticism refers to
the more sweeping reform of co-determination, under which boards are
comprised of various corporate constituencies. However, the congressio-
nal experience suggests that according the board power to balance inter-
ests could also cause delay if the board took seriously its obligation to
balance these interests or if the interests themselves pressured the
boards to do so."7 Moreover, the incremental quality of the plant-clos-
113. Id.
114. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (1991).
115. The Act exempted companies that closed plants due to "business circumstances
that were not reasonably foreseeable" at the time that the 60-day notice would have
been triggered, and in situations in which the employer "reasonably and in good faith
believed that giving the notice required would have precluded the employer from ob-
taining the needed capital or business." Id. at § 2102(b).
116. NEIL H. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 174 (1973).
117. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 6, at 2269 (observing that "[i]f
directors are required to consider other interests ... the decision-making process
will become a balancing act or search for compromise").
ing legislation illustrates that a rigorous balancing of interests is antithet-
ical to the decisiveness and risk-taking that are critical attributes of busi-
ness decisions.
According the board some power over its agenda, and assisting it
through the formation of more active committees and a small indepen-
dent staff, Would provide corporate governance the benefits of the con-
gressional model without its costs. These reforms need not increase
delays that threaten corporate effectiveness, and they would lead to
more informed decisionmaking. In addition, an independent staff for the
board and/or its committees would improve its capacity to respond to
management failure in a timely fashion.
Increased agenda-setting power and informational resources for boards
of directors might also have in terrorem effects. Corporate managers
tend to be sensitive to threats. For example, takeovers help discipline
even those managers whose corporations are not acquired.' Similarly,
the prospect of plant-closing legislation caused many corporations to give
workers advance notice long before Congress enacted the measure. " '
External pressures are also needed to give effect to enhanced board
powers, just as interest groups and the press help ensure that elected
officials use their powers to generate responsive public policies. In the
corporate context, the courts and the markets hold boards accountable.
Narrow construction of the constituency statutes would help restore at
least some of the discipline exerted by the market for corporate control.
Meaningful judicial review can help ensure that the board takes seriously
any new powers given to it to check management. Existence of a judicial
remedy is particularly important since countervailing pressures inside the
boardroom give grounds for pessimism about the effectiveness of struc-
tural reform. These include the consensual nature of the boardroom
decisionmaking process2. and the fact that most outside directors are
drawn from the ranks of corporate management and may empathize with
rather than police the actions of corporate management.'
An effective judicial standard would redefine the business judgment
rule along the lines adopted by the ALI Principles to introduce an objec-
tive component to the subjective good faith standard that heretofore has
characterized the rule. 2 A tougher business judgment rule should not
118. See Gilson, Tender Offers, supra note 16, at 841.
119. As the Chicago Tribune reported: "While Corporate America fought the bill in
Congress and in the statehouses, the constant legislative focus on the issue forced
corporations to change dramatically the way they treated their workers when they
had to shut plants. Sudden, massive shutdowns . . . have for the most part faded
from the economic landscape." Goozner, supra note 110, at Cl.
120. LORSCH, supra note 28, at 93.
121. See id.
122. ALI Principles provide that a director fulfills his duty of care if, inter alia, he
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be viewed as a one-sided attempt to invite litigation or to penalize direc-
tors and deter risk-taking. Rather, it would represent an enforcement tool
commensurate with the increased power and capacity of boards to over-
see management's performance. With more vigorous committees and
staff resources, boards should be able to satisfy a more stringent busi-
ness judgment rule.
A plan to reform corporate governance should not, however, depend
entirely on judicial review as a source of accountability. The judicial
remedy is an expensive, time consuming, and limited means of ensuring
the integrity of decisional processes. Establishment of checks and bal-
ances, through legislation where necessary, constitutes a more compre-
hensive and efficient means of establishing appropriate power relation-
ships in governments and in corporations. As a result, judicial review
should constitute part, but not all, of a proper reform strategy.
The process by which states enacted constituency statutes also con-
tains important lessons for corporate governance.'23 A full package of
governance reforms would limit the discretion of corporate managers to
use corporate funds to lobby for such anti-shareholder measures, or to
purport to represent their corporate entities when lobbying for the mea-
sures. Under the current regime, lobbying decisions and expenses receive
the protection of the business judgment rule. This standard appropriately
protects lobbying on issues where managers can be expected to pursue
shareholders' interests, such as environmental or labor laws. How to
limit management's lobbying discretion presents a more complicated
question. At first glance, it seems self-defeating and doctrinally inconsis-
tent to apply Unocal to takeover defenses while applying the business
judgment rule to management efforts to encourage enactment of constit-
uency statutes that insulate these defenses from meaningful judicial re-
view.
However, extending Unocal to management lobbying for constituency
statutes would probably do more harm than good. The resulting deriva-
tive actions would entail difficult line-drawing about the exact nature of
lobbying efforts, and could deter managers from lobbying legislatures
altogether, even for measures in shareholders' interests. For example,
"rationally believes that [his] business judgment is in the best interests of the corpo-
ration." Use of the word "rationally" introduces an objective component to the stan-
dard. ALl Principles, supra note 13, at § 4.01(c)(3) cmt. d.
123. One commentator reports that enactment of the Connecticut statute was almost
exclusively at the behest of corporate managers, with little or no support from the
other constituencies the statute purported to help. Romano, supra note 1, at 122-23.
corporate lobbying for a certain health-care reform package, which
would increase business expenses in the short term, might be justified in
terms of long-term profitability as a means of attracting or retaining pro-
ductive employees. Alternatively, supporting such a measure might be de-
fended on tactical grounds as the lesser of two evils. Additionally, the
sheer ambiguity of the statutes' formulations suggest the difficulty of
litigating the lobbying that inspired their enactment.
A more effective means to limit managerial legislative activity is
through internal corporate processes. These could include board-imposed
limits or shareholder proposals similar to those that seek to opt out of
the substantive provisions of constituency statutes, or to amend articles
of incorporation to authorize only narrow corporate goals.'24
The reforms outlined in this section represent appropriate means to
cabin managerial discretion and to improve corporate governance toward
the goal of profitability. However, they do not directly address the con-
tention that the constituency statutes represent appropriate social poli-
cy-a critical consideration. The remainder of this Article examines this
subject.
V. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
An intuitively appealing argument in favor of broad corporate goals
and constituency statutes is that, when compared to political governance,
corporate governance represents the lesser of two evils."u One com-
mentator defends the expansion of corporate goals by criticizing what he
terms the "inherent" flaws of regulation.2 ' These inherent flaws result
from systemic defects in the congressional lawmaking process, notably
the "paramount ... desire [of Members of Congress] to seek re-elec-
tion," 7 and the inability of "unorganized victims of externalities" to
help set the congressional agenda.'28 It follows that we have little to
lose and much to gain from according corporations the power to balance
the interests of corporate constituencies. Since federal legislation could
124. For examples of such shareholder proposals, see INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL REPORT: THE 1990 PROXY SEASON 14-15 (Aug. 1990).
125. As Dean Robert Clark observes, "the most serious criticisms against [narrow
corporate goals] are those that attack the notions that external government regulation
of corporations can be an effective way of correcting market failures .... " CLARK,
supra note 7, at 680.
126. Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corpo-
rate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343,
377 (1981).
127. Id. at 381.
128. Id. at 382.
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preempt or mitigate most unwise balancing decisions, the argument must
rest on the premise that according corporations some shared power over
social policy would yield net positive benefits.
Yet, many institutional constraints that limit political discretion are-ab-
sent in the corporate sphere. For example, the media's political bias in
favor of the interests of the "unorganized" checks the excessive influence
of private groups in Congress. Put simply, special-interest politics makes
good copy but bad publicity.'29 At least when an "externality problem
does reach the Congressional agenda," the media plays a constructive
role in keeping it there.3
More broadly, the argument that the political process is defective must
be measured against the alternative created by constituency stat-
utes-balancing interests in the nation's boardrooms as well as on Capi-
tol Hill and in state legislatures-which contains the potential for man-
agement to abuse its discretion, given the absence of internal and exter-
nal controls and the lopsided distribution of power among the partici-
pants. As one scholar observed about broad corporate goals long before
the advent of these statutes, "[s]ooner or later, someone asks why corpo-
rate managers, as persons performing the peculiarly political function of
impartially balancing conflicting interests, should escape the political
controls that normally accompany such a function.'' Evidence of that
concern arises from a wide variety of sources.
A. Public Versus Private Decisionmaking Processes
That political decisionmaking is subject to greater public scrutiny than
corporate decisionmaking justifies different judicial treatment of these
processes. Two doctrines of federal antitrust immunity are illustrative.
Under the "state action" doctrine, state and local governments are im-
mune from antitrust liability for engaging in anti-competitive conduct. 2
Extending this immunity to a municipality in Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire,"n a unanimous Supreme Court explained that "municipal
129. An example is the controversy over the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal.
When the Lincoln Savings & Loan failed, it generated a lot of negative publicity. See
Robert Rosenblatt, Combative DeConcini Defends S&L Deals, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1991, at A26.
130. Weiss, supra note 126, at 382.
131. Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the
German, 80 HARv. L. REV. 23, 89 (1966).
132. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
133. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
conduct is invariably more likely to be exposed to public scrutiny than is
private conduct" due to sunshine laws and the electoral process."u The
Court also exempts businesses from antitrust liability for seeking to re-
strain or monopolize trade through lobbying or petitioning government,
which is considered protected First Amendment speech under what is
known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'35 Yet in Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.," the Court refused to accord Noerr-
Pennington immunity to the efforts of steel conduit manufacturers to
enact a trade association product standard, stressing that the
association's decision did not take place in the open political arena but
"took place within the context of the standard-setting process of a pri-
vate association."'37 Significant to the Court's reasoning was its concern
that the anti-competitive "restraint [at issue was] imposed by persons
unaccountable to the public and without official authority .... ""
Hallie and Allied Tube reflect a traditional judicial and political con-
cern about self-regulation by private industry. In each case, the Court
reasoned that an overly broad grant of antitrust immunity for a private
party would allow the fox to guard the chicken coop.'39 This fear
underlay the Court's emphasis on the absence of public scrutiny over
corporate conduct when compared with the governmental process.
134. Id. at 45 n.9. The court juxtaposed municipal conduct with the actions of pri-
vate entities, such as rate-setting boards, which remain more insulated from public
accountability. Id.
135. The doctrine owes its name to Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), reh'g. denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961), and Unit-
ed Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
136. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
137. Id. at 504.
138. Id. at 502.
139. Allied Tube repeatedly expressed concern that extension of Noerr immunity
risked anti-competitive regulation at the hands of the regulated. The Court worried
that "the members of [trade] associations often have economic incentives to restrain
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious
potential for anticompetitive harm." Id. at 500. The Court also expressed concern that
"the restraint [at issue] is imposed by persons ... many of whom have personal
financial interests in restraining competition .... " Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, the Court held that "where, as here, an economically interested party
exercises decision-making authority in formulating a product standard for a private
association that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immuni-
ty . . . ." Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added).
In Hallie, the Court expressed fears of self-regulation by way of comparison, in
order to justify extension of state action immunity to the City of Eau Claire. The
Court reasoned, "absent a showing to the contrary, that a municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting
primarily on his or its own behalf." Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985).
[Vol. 21: 777, 1994] Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Judicial concerns about self-regulation are hardly unique to the Court's
constructions of the Sherman Act. Similar sentiments appeared in two
prominent cases in the 1930s that struck down as unconstitutional feder-
al legislation according significant lawmaking power to private industry
groups.4 In the first of these cases, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,' the Court invalidated a portion of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act that authorized private trade associations to regulate
working conditions and "unfair trade practices" under the guise of the
"Live Poultry Code." Most offensive to the Court was that "Congress...
delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or
groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise
and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or
industries."4 '
The following year, in Carter v. Carter Coal, Inc., the Court struck
down certain sections of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, under
which coal producers set industry-wide labor relations practices.' By
invalidating the legislation, the Court again expressed concerns about
self-regulation, reasoning that the statute constituted "delegation in its
most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an of-
ficial body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose in-
terests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the
same business."'45
Corporate governance has much in common with these antitrust and
non-delegation cases. In all three areas, the law tries to balance the dis-
tribution of public and private power and attempts to craft rules to mini-
mize the corrosive effects of opportunistic corporate behavior. Although
140. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1938); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Despite the dormancy of the
"nondelegation doctrine" in constitutional law, these two decisions have been distin-
guished from other nondelegation cases, and thus perhaps retain vitality at least as
statements of the broad principle that delegation of lawmaking to private groups,
rather than agencies in the executive branch, is constitutionally suspect. See PETER
STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 65 n.48
(1989).
141. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
142. Id. at 537.
143. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
144. Id. at 279-317. Interestingly, the case arose when a stockholder of a coal com-
pany brought an action against the board of directors for its compliance with the
Code. Id. at 286.
145. Id. at 311.
the antitrust and non-delegation cases involve dealings among, rather
than within, corporations, these cases share, with corporate governance,
concerns about self-dealing.
In addition, both antitrust law and the traditional profit maximization
school of corporate governance seek to maintain a general division of
responsibility between government and corporations. In general, govern-
ment should make policy and corporations should make money. Thus,
prohibiting corporations from balancing the interests of constituencies at
shareholders' expense is like refusing to authorize a supermarket cooper-
ative to design competition policy in the grocery industry,4 ' or.prevent-
ing an association that includes burner manufacturers from boycotting
what it views as an unsafe burner.
47
More subtly, antitrust law and corporate governance share concerns
about the excessive concentrations of power likely to result in the ab-
sence of constraints. Society's acceptance of fewer institutional con-
straints in corporations demonstrates a willingness to trust markets to
check corporate power, except when governments must intervene to cor-
rect market failures. The concerns about accountability in Allied Tube
and Hallie, as well as the Court's concern about the breadth of its anti-
trust immunity doctrines, can be explained on this ground. But this ratio-
nale is viable only to the extent that market constraints work. Just as
anti-competitive conduct among corporations threatens to undermine the
product markets, takeover defenses installed after interest balancing
within corporations impede the workings of the capital market. Through
narrow construction of constituency statutes, corporate law should seek
to protect the workings of markets. The behavior of corporate managers
in the political arena provides a more concrete illustration of the dangers
of constituency statutes. The following discussion describes a series of
lobbying efforts mounted by corporate management groups.
B. Corporate Lobbying
The high level of support among corporate management for broad
corporate goals is relatively new and coincides with its fear of hostile
146. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1972) (rejecting
defendant's argument of increased interbrand competition on ground that "Topco has
no authority under the Sherman Act to determine the respective values of competi-
tion in various sectors of the economy . .. [since such a decision] must be made by
Congress and not by private forces ... [who] are too keenly aware of their own
interests in making such decisions").
147. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(upholding antitrust action by gas heater manufacturer against trade association that
refused to issue seal of approval for manufacturer's burner and some of whose mem-
bers refused to distribute the burner).
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takeovers. As the Washington Post reports:
A dozen years ago, in the activist climate of Watergate and Vietnam War protests,
critics demanded that U.S. corporations be held accountable for their social per-
formance as well as their profits. Now it is the business leadership that talks of its
responsibility to serve a longer list of "stakeholders"-employees, retirees, cus-
tomers, suppliers and communities, as well as stockholders. Business leaders
need these stakeholders as allies in their fight against stockholder-backed take-
over campaigns.'"
A similar transition has occurred with respect to federalization of cor-
porate laws. Following the widely publicized insider trading convictions
of the 1980s, corporate management groups sought federal legislation to
curb the "abuses" in the takeover market. As one corporate lobbyist
explains, "[tihere was a window of opportunity opened with the Wall
Street scandals, starting with [the scandal involving Ivan] Boesky. We
believed at that point.., we had an opportunity to get good disclosure
legislation before Congress." "9 The corporate management lobby
abruptly shifted gears on the preemption question after the Supreme
Court declined to invalidate on preemption grounds the Indiana
antitakeover statute decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America." It then began vigorously pressuring Congress to avoid pre-
empting state antitakeover laws."'
At one level, these reversals appear defensible, particularly if one ac-
cepts the proposition that the aggregate social and economic effects of
takeovers are disputable. Moreover, even takeover proponents might
agree that selective reform in such areas as securities disclosure is ap-
propriate. In this light, the preemption shift could be viewed as nothing
more than legislative forum-shopping, since "[h]istorically, it has been
easier for a corporation to get protection from takeovers in state legisla-
tures than on Capitol Hill." 52
Not surprisingly, the corporate lobby maintains that its solicitude for
corporate constituencies is well intentioned. As one corporate lobbyist
puts it: "[pleople in the communities say in their faces and in their tears
what takeovers have meant to their communities. [Boone] Pickens is
148. Behr, supra note 1, at GI.
149. Kirk Victor, Taking on Takeovers, 20 NAT'L L.J. 81 (Jan. 9, 1988)(quoting John
Pilcher, Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers lobbyist).
150. 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding Indiana antitakeover statute against preemption
and Commerce Clause challenges).
151. Victor, supra note 149, at 79.
152. Id. at 80.
really on the wrong side of the argument as to who has the people on
their side.""
This rhetoric sharply contrasts with corporate management's lobbying
efforts on issues of direct concern to the other constituencies that lend
political and rhetorical support to their lobbying campaign against
takeovers. No historic friend of organized labor, one prominent corporate
lobby has "intermittently launched lobbying and promotion campaigns
since the 1970s aimed at promoting a 'union-free' America. '"" More re-
cently, corporate management vigorously opposed the very modest plant-
closing legislation. When Congress sought to enact the plant-closing mea-
sure as an amendment to the 1988 trade bill, a prominent corporate lob-
by sent telegrams to congressional leaders arguing that the plant-closing
measure was "inimical to U.S. competitiveness and enactment of a sound
trade bill."'"
Corporate management has also vented its anger against institutional
investors, the group that many count on to increase management's
accountability." Early in the Bush Administration, the corporate lobby
proposed amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to limit the discretion of pension-fund managers to accept ten-
der offers."67 The proposals would have clarified what corporate manag-
ers perceive as ambiguities in ERISA regarding the extent to which pen-
sion-fund managers could make investment decisions based on long-term,
as opposed to short-term, value maximization."
The most plausible way to reconcile these seemingly divergent lobby-
ing efforts is to say that they reflect corporate managers' concern with
self-preservation and entrenchment. It is hard to justify trusting corpo-
rate managers with the task of balancing the interests of shareholders
and employees when they actively oppose these groups on other legisla-
tive issues. Taken together with the limited institutional constraints and
lopsided distribution of power in the corporate decisionmaking process-
es, this evidence supports two conclusions. First, it suggests that constit-
153. Id. at 82 (quoting Steven M. H. Wallman, counsel to Coalition to Stop the Raid
on America).
154. Peter Perl, Seminars on 'Deunionizing' Have Become Commonplace; Growing
Management Opposition is Key Factor in Decline of Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
1987, at H2.
155. At least one corporate law scholar has argued that "[mianagement's profession
of concern for stakeholders would be a great deal more credible if, at the same time
management sought the right to block a takeover because of anticipated plant
closings by the acquirer, it also supported plant-closing legislation that protected
stakeholders from its own actions." Gilson, Just Say No, supra note 15 at 126.
156. See, e.g., Black, supra note 24, at 567-75.
157. See Pat Wechsler, Pension Law Defined, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1989, at 47.
158. See id.
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uency statutes will fail to achieve their stated objective-more socially
responsible corporations. Second, it justifies the position that all corpo-
rate constituencies will be better off if their interests are balanced in the
political process and if the corporation concentrates on its traditional
goal of profit-maximization for the benefit of shareholders.
VI. CONCLUSION
A comparison between corporate and political decisionmaking contains
important lessons for the reform of corporate governance. First, the even
distribution of power between Congress and the executive branch pro-
vides a strong reason to fear the current tilt in corporate governance in
favor of managers. From this standpoint, constituency statutes make a
bad situation for shareholders worse. Most striking about the comparison
is the relative weakness of the board of directors when compared to
Congress. For this reason, corporate governance reforms should empha-
size a more powerful and independent board. Such a board should be
composed largely of disinterested directors, should have some influence
over its own agenda, and should have a variety of committees and a
small staff. Corresponding to these increases in the board's capacity for
oversight, the business judgment rule should be enhanced to encourage
board members to take their monitoring responsibilities seriously. None
of these reforms risks or requires bringing the delays of the political
decisionmaking process into the boardroom.
The existing distribution of power within the corporation also suggests
constituency statutes are unlikely to achieve their stated objectives. Cor-
porate managers do not comprise a disinterested group that can be
trusted to balance the interests of corporate constituencies when their
own jobs are at stake. As their lobbying campaigns vividly illustrate,
corporate managements' support for the interests of labor, communities,
and other affected groups on behalf of constituency statutes largely re-
flects self-interest rather than altruism. Additionally, greater public scruti-
ny and more direct interest-group involvement in the public policymaking
process, as well as the internal controls present there, provide sound
reasons to prefer government to corporate management as an interest
balancer.
Although political and corporate governance share concerns about
accountability and concentrations of power, the law has been more vigi-
lant about this problem in government than in the corporation. The im-
portance of corporations to our national economy makes such a gap in
the law disturbing. One way to close the gap is through narrow construc-
tion of constituency statutes and through corporate governance reforms
that redistribute power from managers to directors.
